A 9.0-magnitude earthquake and a
powerful tsunami struck Japan on March 11, 2011.
In its wake, in addition to a mounting death
toll and a trail of devastation, significant
energy-related infrastructure was also rendered
inoperable. In addition to the 11 nuclear
reactors that were automatically shut down,
other electricity generating facilities,
refineries, and electrical grids also came to a
halt—either by design or due to damage. What
condition are these energy infrastructures in
today? What is the situation of energy supply in
Japan? How is Japan responding to the supply
shortages? And, what is the impact of the
earthquake/tsunami on Japan’s energy
security?
The outage in the immediate
aftermath of the earthquake included 6,800
megawatts (MW) of nuclear power capacity and
12.4 gigawatts of thermal power capacity,
representing 6.8 percent of Japan’s total
installed electricity generating capacity.
Shutdowns also affected nearly 1.5 million
barrels per day (mmb/d) of refining capacity, or
nearly one-third of the nation’s total refining
capacity. Of the six refineries shut down (1,485
mb/d), three have since resumed operation (850
mb/d). Refineries that have been operational
also increased utilization rates to make up for
lost capacity elsewhere. However, it will likely
take some time before full capacity is
restored.
Japan has over 40 operating
terminals to import liquefied natural gas (LNG).
Only one small re-gasification terminal in
Miyagi prefecture shut down as a result of the
earthquake. The general health of LNG importing
facilities would allow Japan to continue
importing LNG and potentially compensate for
some of the loss in nuclear power capacity.
Meanwhile, utilities with
earthquake/tsunami–damaged facilities are
planning on re-opening some of their thermal
power plants that have been off-line prior to
the earthquake. For example, Tokyo Electric
Power Company has 10 thermal power plants
(equivalent to 2,800 MW in capacity) that have
been idle since before the earthquake. The
Japanese government expects it to take several
months before the idle plants can be brought
back on-line. Some believe it could take much
longer.
As power plants were shut down by
the earthquake/tsunami, a concern for blackouts
emerged. Initially, 5.27 million households lost
power. As of March 22, some 220,000
households—mostly in the disaster-struck
areas—remain without power. To help reduce the
electricity demand and thus prevent blackouts,
scheduled rolling blackouts were introduced
beginning on March 14. The Japanese government
has also been calling for electricity
conservation by households and businesses.
Thirteen prefectures—including Tokyo, but not in
towns where the critical central government
functions reside—were divided into smaller
groups. The plan calls for each group to undergo
a three-hour blackout on an ad hoc yet recurring
basis. While the rolling blackouts are no longer
scheduled for the Tohoku region, they will
likely continue in Tokyo and its surrounding
prefectures until at least the end of April.
Also, the Japanese government has
decided to reduce industries’ petroleum
stockholding obligations—first by 3 days
(equivalent to some 8 million barrels of oil)
and subsequently by 25 days (the industry
obligation prior to the earthquake was 70 days
of petroleum stockholdings). Japan holds some
170 days of stocks in terms of net imports, well
above the 90-day requirement called for by the
International Energy Agency. At the end of
December 2010, Japan’s total oil stocks were 596
million barrels.
As part of disaster response
efforts, the Japanese government is working to
deliver fuels—including gasoline, kerosene, and
light crude—to the earthquake/tsunami–struck
areas and is setting up emergency service
stations. As the production capacity in the
industrial sector begins to climb back to the
pre–earthquake/tsunami level, it may outpace the
recovery in Japan’s power production capacity.
Also, concerns over power shortages may return
as summer approaches.
Japan is the world’s largest
importer of liquefied natural gas and coal and
the third-largest importer of oil. As Japan is
heavily dependent on energy imports, the
government has been promoting nuclear energy as
a means to diversify its energy sources.
Consequently, the current nuclear reactor crisis
poses a serious challenge to the nation’s energy
security.
Japan currently has 54 operating
nuclear reactors, meeting roughly one-third of
the nation’s electricity demand. Japan is the
third-largest nuclear power generator in the
world after the United States and France. Per
the 2007 government plan, nuclear power’s share
of total power generation was to increase from
27 percent (in 2009) to 40 percent by 2017 and
to 50 percent by 2030. Reportedly, there are 2
new plants under construction and 12 in planning
stages in Japan.
In coming months, there will
likely be serious scrutiny of Japan’s nuclear
power program and its regulatory system.
Particular attention may be given to the life
extension of aging power plants. In addition to
Fukushima Daiichi NPP Unit 1, there are at least
two other reactors that are older than 40 years
(Tsuruga-1 and Mihama-1).
Further, problems in the nuclear
sector will likely push up Japanese demand for
oil and natural gas imports. As Japan has a
limited capacity in coal-fired power generation,
LNG will likely become an interim fuel of
choice. So far, industry experts point out that
the LNG market is well supplied.
The nuclear crisis may also
complicate Japan’s efforts to address climate
change challenges. Nuclear energy has been seen
as an integral part of Japanese plans to achieve
the emission reduction target of 25 percent by
2020. According to the industry, nuclear power
reduces Japan’s CO2 emissions by about 14
percent per year.
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Jane Nakano is a fellow in the
Energy and National Security Program at the
Center for Strategic and International Studies
in Washington, D.C.
Commentary is produced
by the Center for Strategic and International
Studies (CSIS), a private, tax-exempt
institution focusing on international public
policy issues. Its research is nonpartisan and
nonproprietary. CSIS does not take specific
policy positions. Accordingly, all views,
positions, and conclusions expressed in this
publication should be understood to be solely
those of the author(s).
© 2011 by the Center for
Strategic and International Studies. All rights
reserved.
